# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1592
2 September 1999

ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 19 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALGERIA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING EXTRACTS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT FROM THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE 35TH SUMMIT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, HELD IN ALGIERS FROM 12 TO 14 JULY 1999, AS WELL AS RELATED DECISIONS ADOPTED AT THE SUMMIT

I have the honour to forward to you the attached extracts relating to disarmament from the Final Declaration of the thirty-fifth summit of the Organization of African Unity, held in Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, as well as related decisions adopted on that occasion.

I would be grateful if you would ensure that these texts are published in an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and observers at the Conference.

(Signed) Mohamed-Salah DEMBRI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.99-65751 (E)

**Extracts of the final Declaration**
**Of the 35th Summit of the OAU**
**(Algiers, 12 -14 july 1999)**

« We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, solemny declare :

(...) We believe that the nuclear disarmament issue and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction remain a challenge and a crucial urgent problem facing the international community, and to which a definitive and lasting solution can be found only through general and comprehensive disarmament, under strict and effective international control. Africa has always demonstrated its readiness to bring its contribution to bear on this process, as evidenced by the conclusion and implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty. This important step taken by Africa should be complemented by establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East taking into account the interdependance between the security in both regions.

We believe that illegal movement, proliferation and trafficking of light weapons constitue another threat to the peace and security of the continent, and we commit ourselves to combat this scourge and lend our support to the regional and international mechanisms charged with preventing and combating this phenomenon. ».

**Decision on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

The Assembly :

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report ;

2. **ADOPTS** the proposals contained therein ;

3. **HAILS** the Declaration on the moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons adopted in ABUJA on October 1998 by Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ;

4. **WELCOMES** the appeal contained in the said Declaration CALLING ON the OUA to support implementation of the moratorium and ENCOURAGE similar initiatives in other regions of the continent ;

5. **WELCOMES** the initiatives being undertaken by member States and regional Organizations concerning the question of small arms, in particular, the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms, the destruction of surplus and obsolet small arms in South Africa and the destruction of illicit weapons in Mozambique ;

6. **FURTHER WELCOMES** the work of the United Nations, through its Group of Experts on Small Arms and the draft Protocol on the Illicite Manufacturing of and circulation, proliferation and trafficking in Firearmes, Ammunitions and other related materials, supplementary to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ; the European Union, through its joint Action on Small Arms ; and the Organization of American States, through its Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking, in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related Materials ;

7. **APPEALS** to the international Community to render to the African countries all necessary assistance to enable them to implement programmes to effectively deal with the problems associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons ;

8. **REITERATES** the urgency and the need for inter-African cooperation in addressing the problems associated with the illicit use, transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and EMPAHISES the primary role the OAU can play in co-ordinating actions in those affected areas ;

9. **URGES** the Secretary-General to further seek the views of Member States on the illicit trafficking, circulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in particular, to seek their views on actions to be undertaken ;

10. **CALLS** for a coordinated African approach to the problems posed by the illicit trafficking, circulation and proliferation of small arms, under the OAU, taking into account the regional experiences and activities in this matter ;

11. **STRESSES** the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of light weapons on the increased involvement of children as soldiers and the psycho-social trauma thereof and the need to comply with the African Charter for the Rights and Welfare of Children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ;

12. **FURTHER APPEALS** to all Member States and to the International Community to assist in the psycho-social rehabilitation of children who have been affected by trafficking, circulation and the proliferation of light weapons ;

13. **REQUESTS** the OAU Secretariat to organize, to that effect a preparatory conference on this matter at ministerial level, prior to the international Conference scheduled for the year 2001 and to seek the support of the relevant UN agencies and other actors concerned, so as to evolve an African common approach ;

14. **FURTHER REQUESTS** the Secretary-General to report to the next Session of the Council of Ministers.

**Decision on the « First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of the Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction »**

**The Assembly :**

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the relevant information contained in the Report of the Secretary-General on the « First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their destruction », held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 3-7 May 1999 ;

2. **CONSCIOUS** that the isue of anti-personnel mines constitutes a major public health threat and a source of concern in the international political agenda, requiring a global approach in order to address the negative effects of these deadly devices ;

3. **COMMENDS** the rapid entry-into-force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their destruction,

4. **RECOGNIZES** that the proliferation of anti-personnel mines constitutes an issue of insecurity which affects free circulation of people and goods in affected countries ;

5. **EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN** for the devasting effects of anti-personnel mines on human lives and their negative impact on the country's economic development ;

6. **COMMENDS** all States parties to the Convention ;

7. **CALLS UPON** all countries which have note done so to sign and ratify the Convention ;

8. **EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION** for the outcome of the Maputo meeting ;

9. **SUPPORTS FIRMLY** the objectives and purposes enshrined in the « Maputo Declaration » ;

10. **REQUESTS** the Secretary-General to continue to sensitize Member States to contribute to the effective implementation of the Convention.

## Decision on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

**The Assembly :**

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the progress made since its thirty-fourth Ordinary Session in efforts to consolidate the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa ;

2. **EXPRESSES SATISFACTION** at the appointment by the the UN Secretary-General of a Director of the Centre ;

3. **REAFFIRMS ITS UNWAVERING SUPPORT** for the revitalization of the Centre and underscores the need to provide it with the necessary ressources to enable it to consolidate its activities and implement its programmes ;

4. **FURTHER REAFFIRMS** the need to establish close collaboration between the Centre and the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on the one hand, and, on the other, between the Centre and the Sub-regional organizations working for peace, security and development :

5. **ONCE AGAIN INVITES** the General Secretariat to establish close cooperation with the Centre ;

6. **URGES** Member States and the International Community to support the Centre by making financial contributions to it and assisting it in any other way to help in the promotion of its activities ans effectiveness ;

7. **REQUESTS** the Secretary-general to report to its 36$^{th}$ Ordinary Session.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1593
6 September 1999

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LETTER DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Please find enclosed the declaration of the European Union on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations. The associated countries to the EU align themselves with this declaration.

On behalf of the EU member States I would like to ask that this declaration be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Markku Reimaa
Ambassador

GE.99-65792

## Declaration of the European Union on the FMCT

*The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta align themselves with this declaration.*

As the 1999 session of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to its conclusion, the European Union and the associated countries assure their support to the efforts of the President of the Conference on Disarmament to come to an agreement to start substantive work as soon as possible. At the same time they appreciate the work done by the previous Presidents in this difficult issue.

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty has been the long-standing goal of the international community. In 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously recommended negotiations on a FMCT. In the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty unanimously recognised the importance of such negotiations in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the NPT. In 1995, and again in 1998, the Conference on Disarmament decided to establish an ad hoc committee. The General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously welcomed this decision in 1998 and encouraged the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish this ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1999 session.

The European Union believes that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty constitutes, after the CTBT, a major step towards the achievement of both the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives envisaged in the NPT document on principles and objectives.

The European Union is convinced that a FMCT, by irreversibly limiting the fissile material stockpiles available for use in nuclear weapons and by establishing an effective verification system, will strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will constitute a significant step towards the realization and effective implementation of article VI of the NPT.

In view of the agreement in the CD in August 1998 to establish an ad hoc committee on FMCT, it is incumbent on the CD to take an early decision to resume these negotiations.

The Member States of the European Union and the associated countries have a very clear position and objective: they will continue to work strenuously for the FMCT, they are ready to participate in negotiations on such a treaty actively and constructively and they will promote an early and successful outcome of negotiations.

The EU is of the view that the negotiations should start immediately and efforts should be pursued vigorously to reach an agreement on the remaining elements of a substantive programme of work.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1594
7 September 1999

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY MR. SHAMSHAD AHMAD, FOREIGN SECRETARY OF PAKISTAN, AT THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES IN ISLAMABAD ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1999 ON "REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE"

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement made by Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on 7 September 1999 on "Regional and Global Implications of India's Nuclear Doctrine".

I shall be grateful if this statement is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by Mr. Shamshad Ahmad,
Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
on 7th September 1999

Mr. Chairman,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

India's nuclear doctrine announced last month is a logical evolution of India's nuclear ambitions that it pursued since its independence. India developed its nuclear option as a matter of choice and policy consistent with its long held vision as a regional hegemon and a major global power. In contrast, Pakistan has exercised nuclear option only in response to the compulsions of its security environment. It is easy to understand why Pakistan's security concerns are so deep and so constant.

Since its independence, Pakistan has confronted nothing but endemic hostility from India which imposed three wars on us and dismembered our country in 1971. It used military force to occupy Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh in violation of the principles governing the independence and partition of India. It annexed the independent Kingdom of Sikkim and occupied the Portuguese territory of Goa in 1961.

Even now, India is engaged in a brutal war to suppress the right of self-determination of the people of occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Despite its propaganda about the so-called threat from China, almost all of India's military assets - an army of 1.2 million, over 700 combat aircraft, a large naval flotilla - are deployed against Pakistan.

For the past fifty years, India has sought, with single-minded devotion, the re-enactment of the Akhand Bharat or greater India dream. It has sought to dominate its periphery and the entire Indian Ocean region, as the first step towards recognition of its stature as a global power.

In contrast, Pakistan's foremost concern has been to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We neither seek nor endorse spheres of influence. Territorial aggrandizement has never been our policy, indeed it is an anachronistic concept.

Before coming to power, India's present Hindu fundamentalist leadership had declared that it would conduct nuclear tests and "induct" nuclear weapons. It also threatened to launch attacks on Pakistan across the Line of Control in Kashmir. The first of these threats was carried out last year. A year later saw the crisis along the LoC in Kashmir where active conflict continues and now India has outlined its military goals in its nuclear doctrine.

In evaluating the implications, it is essential to be aware of the ambitions of India, and the compulsions of

Pakistan. What is clear is that India's nuclear programme is status driven, ours security motivated. Unfortunately, our friends never paid sufficient attention to the root cause of insecurity and instability in South Asia, the unresolved Kashmir issue which continues to afflict the region with the real prospect of a wider conflict between two nuclear weapon states.

Ladies and gentlemen,

India's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, though often disguised by deceit and hypocrisy, has been no secret. It acquired a research reactor and other nuclear facilities outside international safeguards in the 1960s. It refused to sign the NPT in 1968. It insisted on the legitimacy of "peaceful nuclear explosions". India, meanwhile, diverted nuclear fuel from its "civilian" programme to explode a so-called "peaceful" nuclear device in May 1974. Since then, it expanded the scope of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and fissile material stocks. Nuclear weapons development was accompanied by the development of nuclear delivery systems, specially ballistic missiles.

Pakistan's actions in the nuclear and missile fields - were taken at each stage, in response to India's escalatory steps.

Through its research and development programmes, Pakistan was able to acquire the capability for nuclear enrichment and missile technology despite discriminatory embargoes and restrictions. We now have the capability and the potential to respond to India's escalatory steps.

However, our policies have always been marked by restraint and responsibility. We have been sensitive, in fact responsive, to global non-proliferation concerns.

In 1968 when the NPT was being negotiated, Pakistan's concern was focussed on obtaining positive security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states. On the other hand, India was pre-occupied with its challenge to the global nuclear paradigm which the Treaty was seeking to establish.

Since then, every single non-proliferation proposal for South Asia has emanated from Pakistan. After the Indian nuclear test in 1974, we tabled a resolution at the UN, year after year, for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

We proposed a joint Pakistan-India declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978. The same year we suggested mutual inspection by Pakistan and India of each other's nuclear facilities.

In 1979, we proposed simultaneous adherence to the NPT by Pakistan and India as well as simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.

We proposed a bilateral or regional Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1987, a South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994 and a non-aggression pact in 1997.

Unfortunately, these proposals which sought to establish a non-discriminatory and equitable nuclear weapons free regime in our region were rejected by India and ignored by the international community. In fact, India was encouraged to pursue its nuclear weapons programme.

It was only after 1989, when it became clear that we had acquired a nuclear capability, that a regional approach towards non-proliferation was endorsed by the major powers. Even then, no sooner had Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan, sanctions were imposed on us. This only further encouraged India to proceed apace with its nuclear and missile development progrmmes. The objective of non-proliferation in South Asia was thus defeated. The fault was certainly not ours.

The nuclearization of South Asia is neither of our making nor of our choice, but it is now a reality that cannot be wished away.

Three years ago, Pakistan voted in favour of the CTBT in the UN General Assembly. India opposed it.

Never was the threat to our independence, in fact our survival, more pronounced than in the fateful month of May 1998.

India's nuclear tests radically altered the strategic balance in South Asia. Peace was imperilled. We faced nuclear blackmail. The Indian leadership demanded that we must accept the new reality of the changed strategic balance. They even questioned the credibility of our nuclear capability. This posed the risk of a serious and disastrous miscalculation on their part.

We neither had a security alliance nor could we depend on the nuclear umbrella of the major powers. We realized that we were alone in the face of a nuclear India.

It became imperative for us to respond. We restored the strategic balance and established nuclear deterrence. We have no doubt that our tests served the interest of peace and stability in South Asia.

It was not Pakistan but India which added the nuclear dimension to the perilous security environment of our region.

India thus irrevocably shattered the objective of a nuclear free South Asia.

Pakistan was obliged to conduct its nuclear tests to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence against India. Following the tests we acted with a great sense of responsibility. We emphasized the need to prevent a nuclear

and missile arms race. We declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We expressed our desire for mutual restraint in the operational deployment of nuclear weapons. We sought to evolve a risk reduction mechanism and to maintain deterrence at the minimum level.

We have always believed that nuclear deterrence could be exercised by Pakistan and India at the lowest possible level. We were, therefore, initially encouraged by Indian statements that it wanted to maintain a position of "credible minimum deterrence". However, New Delhi left the interpretation of this concept deliberately vague. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh asserted that "credible minimum deterrence" was a dynamic concept and not fixed in "time and space". Thus India was again playing the role of a wolf in sheep's clothing. Its true nuclear and military ambitions were soon to be unmasked.

Following the initiation of our dialogue with the United States last summer, Pakistan developed the concept of three inter-related elements to enhance peace and security in South Asia i.e. nuclear restraint and stabilization, conventional arms balance and the resolution of outstanding conflicts and disputes. This concept spelt out, in fairly specific terms, a Strategic Restraint Regime which encompassed prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile race, risk reduction mechanism and the proposition that nuclear deterrence should be pursued at the lowest possible level.

The concept of a Strategic Restraint Regime was shared and discussed in our dialogue with the United States, both at the political and expert levels. It was also formally proposed to India last October.

The nuclear doctrine announced by India is obviously incompatible with both the idea of "credible minimum deterrence", as well as the concept of a "Strategic Restraint Regime".

The Indian nuclear doctrine reveals New Delhi's goal of acquiring massive nuclear war-fighting capabilities - a "triad" of up to 400 operationally deployed ground, air and sea-based nuclear weapons. Not all of the five NPT nuclear weapons States possess such a triad. A nuclear force as large as this may be credible but it will certainly not be "minimum".

The announcement of the Indian doctrine has confirmed the concerns which Pakistan has so often expressed to the international community regarding India's nuclear ambitions. The size of India's nuclear arsenal, and its operational deployment, would transform it into a threatening "first strike" force against Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Such massive deployment cannot conceivably be designed purely for deterrence. India's profession of "non-first use" of nuclear weapons is only a facade to justify a second strike capability and large scale acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons. Also, as we have pointed out, India's "offer" of a no-first-use and non-use against non-

nuclear States is not meant to reassure Pakistan or others, but it is primarily aimed at securing for itself the status of a nuclear weapon State.

The world must fully comprehend the near and long-term strategic implications of India's nuclear doctrine. India seeks to develop a massive nuclear weapons capability, but this is not designed to maintain "credible deterrence" against Pakistan, nor is it meant for nuclear deterrence against China. For "minimum credible deterrence" India does not need 150 to 400 nuclear warheads. It does not need sea-based and submarine-based nuclear capabilities. It does not require huge conventional land, sea and air forces, including aircraft carriers and advanced strike aircraft.

Certainly, deterrence is not India's desire. India's plans for developing a vast conventional force coupled with a large nuclear arsenal are aimed at building an offensive, and not a defensive, military capability.

India is feverishly trying to establish, within the next two decades, total military hegemony in South Asia and beyond, control the sea lanes, from the oil-rich Gulf in the West to the Straits of Malacca in the East, and compete for influence on the global stage with the major powers.

The militaristic dreams of the current Hindu fundamentalist leadership are a reflection of India's aggressive mythology to which I have already referred. The leadership in New Delhi seem to be living in a time warp. They equate greatness with military prowess. They forget that in today's integrated world, greatness comes primarily from economic and technological advancement and not from military capability.

These Indian dreams of grandeur constitute a threat to this region, to the world, and indeed to the poor and deprived people of India itself.

India's planned military programme will be extremely expensive Estimates of the cost vary widely from 20 billion dollars up to hundreds of billions of dollars.

What also needs to be emphasized is that these huge outlays will be in addition to massive military expenditures which India is to incur under the defence supply agreements, for example, with Russia and France and its on-going indigenous build-up of conventional forces. The manufacture of hundreds of warheads and missiles, the acquisition of satellite early-warning capabilities, the development of sea-based and submarine-based nuclear systems, will all entail huge additional costs.

The development of such a nuclear arsenal by India will oblige Pakistan to take appropriate action to preserve the credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture and the capability for conventional self-defence. One recourse is for Pakistan to engage in a nuclear and conventional arms race with India. It will require Pakistan to expend even

large resources for defence, further eroding its economic and development goals.

A prevalent theory is that, by pushing Pakistan into a huge military build up, India intends to destroy Pakistan's economy. An analogy is drawn with that of the Soviet economy which crumbled as a consequence of the Cold War arms race against the United States. The error in this theory is the assumption that we will, like lemmings, follow India's militaristic example.

Let me state clearly and unequivocally that Pakistan can and will find ways and means to maintain credible nuclear deterrence against India without the need to match it - bomb for bomb, missile for missile.

Apart from provoking a response from Pakistan, India's plans may also compel some of the nuclear weapons states, and others in Asia - from the Gulf to the Pacific - to respond to the projected Indian military build-up. Thus, the pursuit of India's nuclear doctrine will be highly destabilizing for peace and security across the Indian Ocean region and beyond.

Furthermore, the Indian nuclear doctrine will militate against major nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, including perhaps the CTBT and the Fissile Materials Treaty.

If its doctrine is to be implemented, India will require nuclear warheads to be placed on its short, medium and longer-range missiles. It would want to match the other nuclear powers by developing thermonuclear weapons. Unless India has received nuclear weapons designs from clandestine sources, it will need to conduct further nuclear weapon tests to achieve the advanced deployment capabilities it desires. In this context, we have noted that certain preparations made by India last year to conduct additional nuclear tests have not been reversed so far. We hope the guardians of non-proliferation will pressure India to reverse these preparations.

The very possibility that India may conduct further nuclear tests creates doubts in Pakistan regarding the advisability of our early adherence to the CTBT. If India does conduct further nuclear tests, this will, once again, oblige Pakistan to respond.

Further nuclear tests by India will completely subvert the CTBT. The first priority for the world must be, therefore, to press India - and not Pakistan to sign and ratify the CTBT and to reverse the preparations it has made for further nuclear tests.

India's intention to manufacture 400 or more nuclear warheads is also of special concern for Pakistan. India will require substantial quantities of fissile material for such a large nuclear force. Under these circumstances,

neither India nor Pakistan could accept the conclusion of an FMCT, much less a moratorium on fissile material production.

Other reports suggest that India already posseses sufficient plutonium to build 400 warheads. If it does not, it will have to accelerate fissile material production in its various unsafeguarded facilities to reach the desired level of stocks.

In either event, Pakistan will be obliged to also build up the amount of fissile material in its inventory in order to maintain the capability for credible nuclear deterrence against the anticipated large Indian nuclear force. Therefore, the pursuit of India's nuclear doctrine will deal a body-blow to the prospects of concluding a Treaty - so widely desired - to halt fissile materials production.

The Indian doctrine also envisages the maintenance of "highly effective conventional military capabilities" ostensibly to "raise the threshold" of conventional and nuclear conflict. This argument is, of course, only an ex-post facto justification for the huge conventional arms build up in which India is already engaged. The growing imbalance in conventional capabilities will accentuate Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence. This will have the consequence of lowering, not raising, the "threshold" of possible use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. But the choice is not ours to make; it is India's.

I must remind those countries which have concluded agreements to supply India with technologically advanced and lethal weapons systems - such as new Mirage 2000s, SU-27s, SU-30s, and S-300 ABM systems - which can be all employed both in the conventional and nuclear mode, that they will be contributing to the destabilization of South Asia. Their actions will have significant negative consequences for Pakistan's security and for the welfare of the peoples of our entire region.

Pakistan has alerted the major powers and other members of the international community to the dangers posed by India's nuclear doctrine which graphically sets out New Delhi's political and military ambitions, nuclear as well as conventional. We appreciate the concerns which have been expressed publicly by some states, and privately by many more, regarding India's nuclear and military intentions and approach. We do not believe that any major power - even those supplying weapons for profit to India - would go so far as to "welcome", or express "understanding" for the Indian doctrine.

In response to criticism, Indian officials, and some of New Delhi's "friends", have observed that the Indian "doctrine" is as yet only a "draft" for debate and not official policy. In fact, the "doctrine" is the consensus report of the National Advisory Board on Security constituted by the Government of India. It was officially released to the public by the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India.

Too often in the past have we seen the manner in which certain major powers have accepted at face value India's ambiguous assurances despite Pakistan's cautionary advice. This happened in the 1960s when we warned that India would secretly divert fuel from the unsafeguarded Cirrus reactor. In 1965, the two superpowers rejected our demarche in the Geneva Disarmament Committee warning against an Indian nuclear explosion. In April last year, just before India conducted its nuclear tests, we were told by high-level emissaries of a great power that they had been impressed by India's self-restraint.

Our friends should not be taken in, yet again, by India's double-talk and sophistry. Its dangerous plans and contentions are writ large for the world to see. Turning a blind eye to these ominous signs will have grave implications.

Pakistan believes that the international community needs to respond in a coherent and determined way to this "doctrine" in order to arrest India's dangerous plans for nuclear and conventional arms escalation. Specially, the international community needs to ask India to assure its neighbours and the world that:

one: it will not conduct further nuclear tests. Until the CTBT comes into force, Pakistan and India could formalize their unilateral moratoriums into a binding bilateral arrangement;

two: it will not operationally deploy its nuclear weapons and will keep them in a non-deployed mode;

three: it will not build the hundreds of nuclear warheads as envisaged by its nuclear "doctrine";

four: it will not produce or possess the large stocks of fissile materials which would enable it to build a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in the future. In this context, steps should be taken to achieve a balance between the unequal stockpiles of India and Pakistan;

five: it will not seek to create sea-based and submarine-based nuclear forces;

six: it will not seek to acquire, develop or deploy anti-ballistic missile systems which could escalate the development and deployment of nuclear arms in the region;

seven: it will refrain from any military-related actions in space;

eight: it will review and restrain its plans for the acquisition and development of advanced aircraft, nuclear submarines and other technologically advanced weapons systems which could accentuate and accelerate the nuclear and conventional arms race in the region;

nine: it will seriously address and resolve the outstanding issues with Pakistan, specially the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, with the active support and involvement of the international community; and

ten: it will enter into negotiations with Pakistan to elaborate a "Strategic Restraint Regime" for South Asia.

In the context of promoting regional military restraint, Pakistan would be greatly encouraged if the international community were to extend its support to our proposal for a "Strategic Restraint Regime" in South Asia.

Also consistent with the objectives of preventing an arms race in this region, those countries which are engaged in the supply of advanced conventional and dual-use weapons technology to India should halt their supplies and such cooperation with New Delhi. We appeal, in particular, to Russia and France in this respect.

In order to promote these objectives of peace and stability in South Asia, and to avert the threat posed by India's nuclear and military plans, Pakistan is maintaining active contacts and consultations with the international community. We shall pursue these consultations at the forthcoming UN General Assembly and in other relevant forums with a view to evolving a broadly agreed approach to deal with the threats to regional and global peace and security emerging from India's political and military ambitions as revealed in its nuclear doctrine.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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7 September 1999

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS


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# I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the fifty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1999 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

# II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

## A. 1999 Session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 18 January to 26 March, 10 May to 25 June and 26 July to 8 September 1999. During this period, the Conference held 29 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions outlined their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Conference.

3. The Conference also held 13 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the rules of procedure, the following member States assumed successively the Presidency of the Conference: United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Algeria, Argentina and Australia. 1/

## B. Participants in the Work of the Conference

5. The representatives of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe participated as Member States in the work of

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1/ See CD/PV.816, pp.25-26.

the Conference. As a result of the decision taken by the Conference at its 831st Plenary meeting on 5 August 1999 (see Section II.E below), the representatives of Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia participated as Member States in the work of the Conference from that date.

C. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 1999 Session

6. At the 809th plenary meeting on 21 January 1999, the Conference adopted its agenda for the 1999 session in conformity with the rules of procedure. The agenda (CD/1562) reads as follows:

"Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 1999 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

7. Transparency in armaments.

8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

7. After the adoption of the agenda, the President made the following statement: "In connection with the adoption of the agenda, I, as the President of the Conference, should like to state that it is my understanding that if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda".

8. In regard to the Programme of Work, the Conference had before it the following official documents:

(a) CD/1566, dated 2 February 1999, entitled "Proposal by the President on the programme of work for the 1999 session of the CD";

(b) CD/1570, dated 4 February 1999, entitled "Proposal on the programme of work", submitted by the Group of 21;

(c) CD/1575, dated 10 March 1999, entitled "Proposal by the President on the programme of work for the 1999 session of the CD";

(d) CD/1586, dated 20 May 1999, entitled "Working paper on the programme of work of the Conference", submitted by the delegations of France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

9. During the annual session, successive Presidents of the Conference conducted intensive consultations with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. These were inconclusive. The Conference did not re-establish or establish any mechanism on any of its specific agenda items during the 1999 session.

10. Also, during plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations expressed their views on this issue. These are duly reflected in plenary records.

D. Attendance and Participation of States not Members of the Conference

11. In conformity with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, the States not members of the Conference listed under the following paragraph attended its plenary meetings.

12. The Conference received and considered requests for participation in its work from 47 States not members of the Conference. In accordance with the rules

of procedure and its decision taken at its 1990 session on its improved and effective functioning (CD/1036), the Conference invited the following non-member States to participate in its work: Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zambia. In accordance with the decision contained in document CD/1588, Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia participated as Members of the Conference as from 5 August 1999.

## E. Expansion of the Membership of the Conference

13. The importance attached to the question of the expansion of its membership was duly recognized by the Conference. The issue was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

14. Requests for membership had been received, since 1982, from the following 26 non-members, in chronological order: Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Greece, Croatia, Kuwait, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Denmark, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Ghana, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Armenia, Thailand, Georgia and Jordan.

15. The Conference had before it document CD/1567, dated 2 February 1999, entitled "Proposal by the President on the Expansion of the Membership of the Conference on Disarmament".

16. At its 831st Plenary meeting on 5 August 1999, the Conference adopted the following decision:

> "The Conference on Disarmament,
>
> Recognizing the importance attached to the question of expansion of its membership,

Confirming the necessity to review its membership at regular intervals, as contained in Rule 2 of its Rules of Procedure,

And without prejudging the consideration to be given to past, present and future applications for membership to the Conference,

Decides, as a further step within this approach, to admit Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia as its members as of 5 August 1999." (CD/1588).

F. Review of the Agenda of the Conference

17. The Conference continued to attach importance to the review of its agenda. The issue was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

G. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference

18. The importance of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

19. In accordance with rule 42 of the rules of procedure, a list of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons was circulated to the Conference (document CD/NGC/33).

## III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1999 SESSION

20. The substantive work of the Conference during its 1999 session was based on its agenda. The list of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as appendix I to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1999, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference, are attached as appendix II to the report.

21. The Conference had before it a letter dated 19 January 1999 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/1561) transmitting all the resolutions dealing with or related to disarmament and international security

adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-third session in 1998, including those making specific reference to the Conference on Disarmament:

53/75 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (operative paras. 2, 4 and 5)

53/76 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (operative paras. 5, 6 and 8)

53/77 C "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes" (operative paras. 1, 4 and 5)

53/77 I "The Conference on Disarmament decision to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (operative paras. 1, 2 and 3)

53/77 O "Regional disarmament" (operative para. 1)

53/77 P "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels" (operative para. 2)

53/77 U "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons" (operative para. 4(b))

53/77 V "Transparency in armaments"(operative para. 6)

53/77 X "Nuclear disarmament" (operative paras. 8, 9, 10 and 11)

53/77 Y "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (operative paras. 12 and 13)

53/78 D "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (operative paras. 1 and 2)

53/79 A "Report of the Disarmament Commission" (operative para. 2)

53/79 B "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" (operative paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9)

22. At its 810th plenary meeting on 26 January 1999 the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference, during which he reiterated the importance he attaches to the work of the Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community (CD/PV.810).

23. In addition to documents separately listed under specific items, the Conference had before it document CD/8/Rev.8*, dated 17 August 1999, entitled "Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament".

A. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

24. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item, including on nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

25. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 8 above, the following documents dealing with this item were submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1563, dated 26 January 1999, entitled "Draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament" submitted by the delegation of Egypt;

(b) CD/1564, dated 28 January 1999, entitled "Interpretation of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament", submitted by the delegation of South Africa;

(c) CD/1565, dated 2 February 1999, entitled "Proposal on nuclear disarmament", submitted by the delegations of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway;

(d) CD/1568, dated 4 February 1999, entitled "Proposal concerning CD action on nuclear disarmament", submitted by the delegation of Canada;

(e) CD/1571, dated 18 February 1999, entitled "Draft decision and mandate on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament", submitted by the Group of 21;

(f) CD/1574, dated 9 March 1999, entitled "Nuclear disarmament: substantive discussion in the Conference on Disarmament", working paper submitted by the delegation of Canada;

(g) CD/1578, dated 18 March 1999, entitled "Elements of an Approach to Dealing with Stocks of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices", working paper submitted by the delegation of Canada;

(h) CD/1590, dated 16 August 1999, entitled "Letter dated 11 August 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament";

(i) CD/1593, dated 6 September 1999, entitled "Letter dated 6 September 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the Declaration of the European Union on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Negotiations."

B. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters

26. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 62-71 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

## C. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

27. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 8 above, the following documents dealing with this item were submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1569, dated 4 February 1999, entitled "Proposal concerning CD action on outer space", submitted by the delegation of Canada;

(b) CD/1576, dated 18 March 1999, entitled "Draft decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its mandate", submitted by the delegation of China.

28. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

## D. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

29. Although no new documents were submitted to the Conference specifically under the agenda item during the 1999 session, the documents listed in paragraph 8 above dealt, inter alia, with this item.

30. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

## E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

31. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 79-82 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

## F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

32. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 83-89 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

33. During plenary meetings of the Conference, a number of delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the issue of anti-personnel landmines, the detailed descriptions of which are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

34. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 8 above, the following documents dealing with the issue of anti-personnel landmines were submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1559, dated 21 October 1998, entitled "Letter dated 16 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey issued on 15 October 1998, concerning the extension of the comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports and transfers";

(b) CD/1572, dated 4 March 1999, entitled "Working paper concerning CD action on an APL transfer ban", submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela;

(c) CD/1582, dated 30 March 1999, entitled "Letter dated 26 March 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of Bulgaria and Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the Joint Statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey on the agreement signed in Sofia on 22 March 1999 on non-use of anti-personnel landmines and their removal from or destruction in the areas of their common border";

(d) CD/1585, dated 4 May 1999, entitled "Note Verbale dated 3 May 1999 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a decree issued on 22 March 1999 by the Government of Ukraine on the extension of the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines";

(e) CD/1587, dated 25 June 1999, entitled " Letter dated 22 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the Final Report of the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo, 3-7 May 1999".

## G. Transparency in Armaments

35. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 8 above, the following document dealing with this item was submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1591*, dated 26 August 1999, entitled " Letter dated 29 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil and the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, which was approved at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Guatemala on 7 June 1999".

36. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

## H. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

37. During its 1999 session, the Conference also had before it the following documents:

(a) CD/1558, dated 15 September 1998, entitled "Letter dated 14 September 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General of the

Conference on Disarmament transmitting the texts of four Joint Statements issued by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton during their recent summit meeting in Moscow";

(b) CD/1560, dated 6 January 1999, entitled "Letter dated 6 January 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement made by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe";

(c) CD/1573, dated 4 March 1999, entitled "Media statement on the decision by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee on the destruction of surplus small arms and light weapons", submitted by the delegation of South Africa;

(d) CD/1577, dated 18 March 1999, entitled "Letter dated 17 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 12 March 1999 in connection with the official entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO";

(e) CD/1579, dated 25 March 1999, entitled "Joint Action of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons", submitted by the delegation of Germany (on behalf of the European Union);

(f) CD/1580, dated 26 March 1999, entitled "Letter dated 25 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of an official statement made by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 18 March 1999 in connection with the adoption by the Senate of the United States of America of a bill on deployment of a national missile defence system";

(g) CD/1581, dated 26 March 1999, entitled "Note Verbale dated 26 March 1999 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the Secretariat of the Conference

on Disarmament transmitting a communiqué issued by the Rio Group on 25 March 1999 on the start of air strikes on Serb military targets by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization";

(h) CD/1583, dated 1 April 1999, entitled "Letter dated 31 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement made by Mr. B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, on 24 March 1999 in connection with the military action by NATO in Yugoslavia";

(i) CD/1584, dated 28 April 1999, entitled "Letter dated 28 April 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Acting Head of Delegation of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a joint press communiqué on issues related to the ABM Treaty";

(j) CD/1589, dated 10 August 1999, entitled "Letter dated 10 August 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of remarks made by President Clinton on 23 July, when he signed the 'National Missile Defense Act of 1999'";

(k) CD/1592, dated 26 August 1999, entitled "Letter dated 19 August 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria addressed to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting extracts relating to disarmament from the Final Declaration of the 35th Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity, held in Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, as well as related decisions adopted at the Summit";

(l) CD/1594, dated 7 September 1999, entitled "Letter dated 7 September 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement made by Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on 7 September 1999 on 'Regional and Global Implications of India's Nuclear Doctrine'".

## I. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

38. To promote substantive progress during its 2000 session, the Conference requested the current President and the incoming President to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and make recommendations, if possible, that could help to commence early work on various agenda items. These consultations shall, inter alia, take into account views presented and discussions held in the 1999 session, and in this connection, the President made the following statement:

"The Conference deliberated on the elements of a possible programme of work but was unable to reach a consensus.

Intensive consultations by successive Presidents, and the proposals put forward by different delegations, groups of delegations and previous Presidential proposals for a programme of work indicated that there were some common elements. However, it was evident that further consultations were needed on two subjects, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and nuclear disarmament, in order to reach consensus.

After further consultations with delegations, informal proposals on these outstanding issues in the programme of work were drawn up and offered as a basis for possible agreement by the Ambassador of Algeria as the then President of the Conference. These were reflected in his statement to the Conference on 17 June 1999 (CD/PV.828). Some views were expressed on these proposals.

After my own intensive round of consultations as CD President I conclude that there is a strong collective interest in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during the next CD session. I therefore propose to jointly conduct with the incoming President consultations during the intersessional months in order to try to achieve this goal. I intend that my consultations should build upon the work done by my predecessors. My successor and I undertake to report to the Conference on the outcome of these consultations."

39. The Conference decided that the dates for its 2000 session would be:

First part: 17 January-24 March 2000

Second part: 22 May-7 July 2000

Third part: 7 August-22 September 2000

40. The annual report to the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as adopted by the Conference on 7 September 1999, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

Leslie Luck
Australia
President of the Conference

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1596
29 September 1999

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG MEMBER STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON INTERACTION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN ASIA

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliment to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit the text of the Declaration on the Principles Guiding Relations Among Member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and kindly requests to distribute it among States Members and Observers of the CD as an official document.

GE.99-66167

# DECLARATION
# ON THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG THE CICA MEMBER STATES

The Member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia,

Reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Considering the growing desire of their peoples to live in an atmosphere of peace, friendship, understanding, good neighbourliness and cooperation;

Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their peoples can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to their security;

Emphasizing the importance of conducting inter-state relations on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality as well as the UN Charter and international law;

Recognizing that the international legal basis of the CICA activity is the UN Charter and international law;

Respecting bilateral and multilateral agreements which are in conformity with principles and purposes of the UN Charter and norms of international law;

Considering that the better understanding and closer relations among them in all fields in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the five principles of peaceful coexistence would be beneficial for the strengthening of peace, stability and security in Asia;

Giving due attention to the prevention of disputes and conflicts and to their peaceful settlement;

Reaffirming that the diversity of national characteristics, traditions, cultures and values of the Asian States is not a divisive but a valuable mutually enriching factor of their relations;

Emphasizing the importance of tolerance in international relations and the significant role of dialogue as a means to reach understanding, remove threats to peace and strengthen interaction and exchange among civilizations;

Also reaffirming their determination to explore, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, the possibilities of combining their efforts to enhance confidence and cooperation in the interests of stability, economic and social development in their region and the whole world;

Recognizing the importance of indivisibility of security in Asia and expressing their resolve to intensify joint efforts in this direction with a view to oppose the challenges and threats to peace, security and stability in Asia;

Emphasizing the importance of confidence-building measures which contribute to safeguarding peace and enhancing security;

Recognizing the close link between peace, security and development in Asia and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each Member State to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and the well-being of all peoples;

Realizing their responsibility for a peaceful and prosperous future of their peoples;

Reaffirming their commitment to achieve full, just and lasting relations of peace, openness, mutual confidence, security, stability and cooperation in Asia by eliminating tensions, seeking peaceful settlement of disputes;

Recognizing the importance of the global elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, and addressing effectively the destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms, as a means towards achieving comprehensive, lasting and stable peace in Asia;

Welcoming initiatives and arrangements aimed at strengthening peace, stability, security and cooperation in Asia;

Declare their determination to respect and put into practice in their relations with each other, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location and level of economic development, the following principles, which are of fundamental significance and shall guide their relations:

I. Sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in sovereignty

The Member States shall respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, territorial integrity, freedom and political independence. They shall also respect each other's right to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and administrative regulations.

According to the framework of international law and in the spirit of this Declaration, all the Member States have equal rights and duties. They shall respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States, international and regional organizations, as well as the right to neutrality. The Member States shall build thus their relations on the basis of mutual benefit and respect.

II. Refraining from the threat or use of force.

The Member States shall refrain in their relations from the direct or indirect threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the states, or any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No considerations may be invoked to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

Nonetheless, in case of any aggression and violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of a member State, the country which is subject to the aggression, preserves its right to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

III. Territorial integrity of the Member States.

The Member States shall respect the territorial integrity of each other. They recognize the inviolability of state boundaries and therefore they shall refrain at present and in the future from any attempt to violate these boundaries.

The Member States shall likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect use of force in contravention of international law, or an object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of their implementation. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legitimate.

IV. Peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Member States reaffirm their commitment to uphold and defend the principles of the UN Charter and international law as well as the means envisaged in the UN Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Parties to any dispute shall immediately establish a contact and negotiate to prevent the outbreak of a conflict and to settle the dispute in accordance with the principles enshrined in this Declaration as well as in the UN Charter and international law. The Member States parties to a dispute as well as the other Member States shall refrain from any actions which might aggravate the situation.

V. Non-intervention in internal affairs.

The Member States shall refrain from any intervention in the internal affairs of another member State.

They shall accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or the threat of such an intervention against another member State.

They shall likewise in all circumstances refrain from any act of military or political, economic, or any other form of interference as means of resolving political problems between them, or directed to subordinate to their own interests the exercise by another member State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, the Member States shall refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities in all its forms, subversive or other activities directed towards overthrowing the state system of another member State or undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Member States.

They reiterate their determination to promote international and regional cooperation to counter and eradicate all sources of terrorism. In this respect they emphasize the importance of participation of all the states in this cooperation.

The Member States shall not support on the territory of another member State any separatist movements and entities, and, if such emerge, not to establish political, economic and other kinds of relations with them, not to allow the territories and communications of the Member States to be used by the above-mentioned movements and entities, and not to render them any kind of economic, financial and other assistance. They reaffirm the right of people living under foreign occupation for self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.

VI. Disarmament and Arms Control

The Member States emphasize that enhancement of security in Asia should be achieved through cooperation of all states in the interest of peace, stability and prosperity

in conformity with purposes and principles of the UN Charter. A comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced approach towards international security should be adopted.

The Member States reaffirm their commitment to the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective control.

They recognize that disarmament, arms control and confidence building measures are essential in achieving the goal of strengthening peace, security and stability in Asia and the whole world. They, therefore, shall endeavour to develop appropriate measures in these fields.

The Member States pledge to support the efforts for the global elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and therefore they commit themselves to an increased cooperation for the prevention of proliferation of all such weapons, including nuclear weapons, which constitute a particular danger to international peace and security. The Member States also emphasize the need to achieve a nuclear weapons free world at an early date.

They support the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons in Asia on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1.

The Member States reaffirm their belief in the need of ensuring security at the lowest level of armament and military forces. They recognize the necessity to curb excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional armaments.

The Member States emphasize that any bilateral or multilateral military arrangements should not be directed at any third party nor should they undermine or pose threats to security of other states.

## VII. Economic, social and cultural cooperation

The Member States shall enhance the process of political consultations and develop cooperation based on mutual interests in the economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, information, scientific and cultural spheres with each member State making its contribution under conditions of full equality.

The Member States affirm the inalienable right of all states to develop, achieve and make use of science and technology for peaceful purposes aimed at progress in economic, social and cultural fields.

The Member States stress that trade and economic cooperation on an equal, mutually beneficial and non-discriminatory basis constitutes an essential element of their relations and is a means of the construction of prosperous Asia. They shall endeavour to elaborate appropriate measures and policies to promote trade and economic cooperation, including, based on bilateral or multilateral agreements, providing necessary transit, transport and communication facilities and contacts with regional economic organizations. They emphasize the importance of the realization of economic and cultural rights as well as the right to development.

The Member States emphasize the need for enhancement of the cooperation in social fields such as fighting drug trafficking, drug abuse and organized crime; solution of refugee problems, health care and disaster relief.

The Member States recognize the uniqueness and the diversity of the cultures of Asian peoples and the contribution they can make to overcoming past differences. They emphasize their determination to strive for the triumph of freedom and for the protection and promotion of their cultural and spiritual heritage in all its richness and diversity. They shall make special efforts to promote better mutual understanding and to enhance cultural exchanges and cooperation in the fields of education and tourism.

The Member States shall pay attention to the creation of material, legal, political, economic and other guarantees which will facilitate conditions for peace, harmony, mutual understanding and stability in the geographical space of the CICA.

VIII. Human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Member States, being committed to act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, reaffirm in this context their commitments to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals irrespective of their race, sex, and religion. They believe that respect, protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms contribute to political and social stability and peace, to the enrichment of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the society as a whole and to the mutual understanding and friendly relations between their peoples.

The Member States attach great importance to the principle of indivisibility of all human rights and in this context emphasize the significance of the realization of all aspects of this principle.

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The Member States emphasize that in the process of the further elaboration of their positions the present Declaration may be complemented with new principles of international cooperation corresponding to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1597
18 October 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

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LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY MR. V.O. RAKHMANIN, DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND PRESS DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1/

I have the honour to transmit a statement made by Mr. V.O. Rakhmanin, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at a press briefing on 5 October 1999.

We would be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed among the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the CD participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) V. SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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1/ This document has been issued and circulated as a General Assembly document (A/C.1/54/3).

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1597*
26 October 1999

ARABIC, CHINESE, ENGLISH,
FRENCH AND SPANISH ONLY

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LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY MR. V.O. RAKHMANIN, DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND PRESS DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1/

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(Signed): V. SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

1/ This document has been issued and circulated as a General Assembly document (A/C.1/54/3).

GE.99-66759 (E)

## Annex

### Statement issued on 5 October 1999 by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

As has been reported, on 2 October 1999 the United States of America conducted, as part of its programme to create a national anti-missile defence system, a flight test of the Minuteman anti-missile rocket using a dummy warhead. This test is a step that runs counter to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty), article 1 of which prohibits even the provision of a base for such a defence.

Such actions by the United States of America in reality tend to undermine the key provisions of the aforementioned Treaty, with all the negative consequences this entails, responsibility for which will lie with the United States.

In fact, the system of international arms control treaties and agreements, the regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the whole system of strategic stability that has been put in place are threatened.

The Russian Federation insists on the preservation and enhancement of the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty as the most important element for ensuring strategic stability in the world and furthering the process of nuclear disarmament. It is thus in the interest of the entire international community resolutely to support this agreement which is so vital to international security.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1598
1 November 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 28 OCTOBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 14 OCTOBER 1999

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit a statement made by an official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 14 October 1999, with a request that it should be distributed as an official document among member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

GE.99-66780 (E)

STATEMENT BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

14 October 1999

Heated debates have recently taken place in the United States Senate concerning the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. This important international instrument is the outcome of many years of effort on the part of many countries, and is of fundamental significance for security and stability in the world and for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We wish to express our disappointment and serious concern at the United States Senate's refusal to ratify this treaty. The United States Administration played a very active role in all stages of its drafting and was the first to sign it. This decision delivered a serious blow to the entire system of agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and particularly to the prospects for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

A very clear trend has been displayed recently in the actions of the United States, which prompts profound concern. In addition to the failure to ratify the CTBT, this includes the adoption of the National Missile Defense Act, new threats of sanctions in the area of export controls, and a series of other measures which have destabilized the foundations of international relations.

We have taken note of President B. Clinton's statement that his Administration will abide by the moratorium on the conduct of nuclear explosions which is currently being observed by all five nuclear Powers. At the same time, as the situation develops, Russia, while maintaining its commitment to the CTBT, considers itself obliged to take the most serious view of the consequences of the Senate's decision regarding the Treaty as far as its own security and stability throughout the world are concerned.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1599
4 November 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

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LETTER DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement by an official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, dated 28 October 1999.

I should be grateful if you would publish the statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and distribute it to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.99-66821 (E)

STATEMENT BY AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

28 October 1999

Russia is not conducting any negotiations with the United States on amendments to the ABM Treaty, much less so with the aim of "adjusting" it to the plans the Americans are known to have to create and deploy a national anti-missile defence system, which is banned under the Treaty.

In Cologne the Russian and United States Presidents agreed that the strengthening of strategic stability can occur only if previously achieved agreements on arms limitation and reduction, above all the ABM Treaty, are complied with.

Moscow is deeply worried about the adoption in the United States of a law that proclaims the deployment of a national ABM system to be United States policy. The deployment of such a system is incompatible with a key provision of the ABM Treaty, indeed its very essence: the commitment of each party not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such defence. Abandoning that commitment would, in effect, "turn the ABM Treaty inside out" - the treaty would thus be permitting the very things it was developed and signed in order to ban, which would be nothing less than de facto termination of the Treaty.

The scrapping of the ABM Treaty would have irreparable consequences for nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation regime, for international security and the security of all States, including Russia and the United States. That is why Russia considers such "adaptation" of the Treaty to be inadmissible. Russia cannot be an accomplice to the destruction of the ABM Treaty.

Moscow believes that as the level of strategic offensive weapons falls, the importance of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty and of making it more viable dramatically increases. The concrete Russian proposals on ways to make the Treaty more viable, in particular to prevent the limitations it imposes from being evaded, are the subject of discussion at the current session of the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, the United States and Ukraine are taking part.

In accordance with the statement issued in Cologne by the Russian and United States Presidents, discussions on START-3 and the ABM Treaty are continuing between Russia and the United States. The second round of these consultations was held in Moscow on 21 and 22 October between the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, G.V. Berdennikov, and acting Assistant United States Secretary of State J. Holum. In these as well as the previous consultations held in August, the Russian side has proceeded from the premises set forth above and has argued that the dismantling of the ABM Treaty would have dangerous consequences. No one should equate Russia's agreement to hold such discussions with agreement to the "adaptation" of the ABM Treaty.

As the Russian Foreign Minister stressed recently, "if the ABM Treaty is violated, it would render all the START negotiations meaningless". This has been and will be the position of the Russian side in discussions of the issues connected with the START-3 Treaty.

Changes in the strategic situation require that every measure should be taken to strengthen the ABM Treaty. It is on this basis, and not on the "ruins" of this treaty (and consequently on the "ruins" of the START, INF, CTBT, NPT and other treaties), that the new challenges should be met. Russia is prepared to continue the process of reduction of strategic offensive arms on this basis, in particular START-2 and START-3. It proposes discussing the creation of a global system to monitor the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, and furthering cooperation with the United States and other States in areas connected with ABM systems, without breaching the limitations imposed by the ABM treaty.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1600
29 November 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

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LETTER DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 23 NOVEMBER 1999 IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBMISSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY, SIGNED BY RUSSIA ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1996, TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR RATIFICATION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement made by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 23 November 1999 in connection with the submission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed by Russia on 24 September 1996, to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

(Signed) Vassily Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

## STATEMENT BY THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

23 November 1999

As you may know, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. B.N. Yeltsin, has submitted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed by Russia on 24 September 1996, to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification. We hope that the State Duma will give favourable consideration to this matter in the nearest future.

This step by the President of the Russian Federation has again demonstrated the consistency of the Russian leadership's policy aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, maintaining strategic stability in the world and preventing the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

In accordance with the undertakings it made, Russia has not carried out nuclear tests since October 1990 and does not intend to resume such tests provided, of course, that the other nuclear States also follow this path.

In Moscow we are convinced that the earliest entry into force of the CTBT is in Russia's national interests, and likewise in the interests of the entire international community.

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